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ACCESS FOR ACCESS: ENSURING ACCESS TO
FEDERAL COURTS FOR PARENTS SEEKING TO
EXERCISE RIGHTS OF ACCESS UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Katherine L. Olson+
Each year, thousands of children are abducted across international borders,
often by one of their parents.1 Of these abductions, many involve travel to or
from the United States.2 In 1980, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law drafted the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (the Convention) to discourage such abductions
and provide a remedy for the non-abducting parent.3 The Convention protects
+
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1. See Nigel V. Lowe & Victoria Stephens, Global Trends in the Operation of the 1980
Hague Abduction Convention, 46 FAM. L.Q. 41, 43–44 (2012) (recording a total of 2,321
applications in 2008 for access or return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction and reporting that 97% of the abductions are by one parent); see
also 2012 Outgoing Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, INT’L
PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 5, http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CY2012-Outgoing_Openstats.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 Outgoing Cases] (showing 1,144 children were
reported to the U.S. State Department as internationally abducted in 2012). Because the vast
majority of Convention cases involve inter-family abduction, this Comment focuses on instances
of abduction by one of the child’s parents.
2. See Lowe & Stephens, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that the United States had 598
applications for return or access in 2008); see also 2012 Outgoing Cases, supra note 1, at 5.
3. See ELISA PEREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD
ABDUCTION CONVENTION ¶ 16, at 429, ¶ 123, at 464 (The Permanent Bureau trans., 1982),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter PEREZ-VERA REPORT]
(explaining the intent of the drafters including “to discourage potential abductors”). Although
this report is not a document that was approved by the Conference that drafted the Convention, id.
¶ 8, at 428, the report “is recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary on
the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of the Convention
available to all States becoming parties to it.” Hague International Child Abduction Convention;
Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986). Scholars interpreting the
Convention often cite Perez-Vera’s report. See, e.g., Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road
Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 304, 327
(2002); Kathleen A. O’Connor, What Gives You the Right?!—Ne Exeat Rights Should Constitute
Rights of Custody after Furnes v. Reeves, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 449, 450 n.10 (2005) (using
the report to illustrate which countries signed the Convention); Melissa S. Wills, Interpreting the
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both custody rights and access rights.4 The United States is a party to the
Convention and has implemented it with legislation that gives federal and state
courts concurrent original jurisdiction over claims arising under the
Convention.5
Despite this grant of jurisdiction, federal courts have answered the following
question differently: Does the Convention, and its U.S. implementing
legislation, afford a private right of action in federal courts to parents who seek
to enforce their right of access in the United States? In 2006, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that rights afforded by the Convention
could only be vindicated in the United States through the U.S. Department of
State.6 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
“[section] 11603 unambiguously create[d] a federal right of action to secure
the effective exercise of rights of access protected under the Hague
Convention.”7
This Comment addresses the disparity created by the decisions of the Fourth
and Second Circuits. It begins with a discussion of the role of treaties in U.S.
domestic law focusing on the Convention and its implementing legislation, the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).8 Next, this Comment
examines developments in case law concerning whether rights of access
convey a private right of action and highlights policy considerations
underlying the interpretation and application of the Convention. Then, it
discusses the conflicting decisions of the Second and Fourth Circuits. Finally,
this Comment argues that access rights should be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction, in part because the Convention’s purpose and ICARA demand
timely action on cases involving the international abduction of children.
I. A TREATY REGARDING CHILD ABDUCTIONS: THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
The Convention was drafted in 1980 to deter international child abduction
and to protect internationally abducted children.9 The U.S. implementing
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile
the Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted Children, and the Underlying
Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 423, 437–48 (2006).
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 1, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
5. See infra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
6. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2006).
7. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 372 (2d Cir. 2013).
8. International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611
(2012).
9. Hague Convention, supra note 4, pmbl.; see also PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶
11 (establishing that the Convention’s drafters were concerned primarily with international child
abduction by a parent seeking “artificial jurisdictional links on an international level, with a view
to obtaining custody of a child”).
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legislation, ICARA, provided federal and state courts with concurrent
jurisdiction for claims arising under the Convention.10 In the United States,
courts have disagreed over the proper interpretation of both the Convention
and ICARA.11
One particular area of difficulty in interpretation concerns access claims. In
Cantor v. Cohen, the Fourth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear claims arising from rights of access under the Convention and ICARA.12
Seven years later, and on similar facts, the Second Circuit held to the contrary
in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, finding that it did have jurisdiction over a petitioner’s
access claims arising under the Convention and ICARA.13 This circuit split is
currently unresolved.

10. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2012). This Comment focuses on federal court jurisdiction over
claims arising under the Convention and ICARA. In general, there is little dispute over state
court jurisdiction over these claims because domestic relations law is traditionally governed by
state law. See, e.g., Maurizio R. v. L.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding
state court jurisdiction over cases arising under the Convention pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
11603(a)); Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 971–72 (Conn. 2000) (recognizing concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction to justify using a federal court’s interpretation of the Convention); In re
Klaas Harm Jesse Kamstra, No. 12-09-00017-CV, 2010 LEXIS 1478, at *12 (Tex. App. Mar. 2,
2010) (accord). See also Sam Foster Halabi, The Supremacy Clause as Structural Safeguard of
Federalism: State Judges and International Law in the Post-Erie Era, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 63, 115 (2012) (stating that “[i]n Viragh v. Foldes, a Massachusetts Family Court judge [found
jurisdiction over an access claim but] determined that the Hague Abduction Convention did not
entitle a non-custodial parent to assert a right of return for violation of access rights only” and
also noting that the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held that “‘rights to access’ belonged
exclusively in state courts”). Additionally, some federal judges abstained from adjudicating
claims arising under the Convention by invoking other state doctrines in the interest of preserving
and protecting family law values. Id. at 118.
11. See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text. In another high-profile case involving a
circuit split over the interpretation of the Convention, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to hear a case involving equitable tolling under one of the exceptions to the
Convention’s return remedy. Lozano v. Alvarez, 133 S. Ct. 2851, 2851 (2013). The Second
Circuit had affirmed the district court’s ruling that “while an abducting parent’s conduct may be
taken into account when deciding whether a child is settled in his or her new environment, the
one-year period set out in Article 12 is not subject to equitable tolling.” Lozano v. Alvarez, 697
F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013). However, other courts allow
equitable tolling in certain situations. See In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[E]quitable tolling is available under the Hague Convention only where ‘the abducting parent
took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the child from the parent seeking return and such
concealment delayed the filing of the petition for return’”) (quoting Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d
563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008)); Bernal v. Gonzalez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 907, 924 n.15 (W.D. Tex. 2012);
Edoho v. Edoho, No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 3257480, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010)) (noting
that petitioner may have a viable equitable tolling defense where she could show that “(1) the
abducting parent concealed the child and (2) the concealment caused the petitioner’s filing
delay”); Dietz v. Dietz, 349 F. App’x 930, 933 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that equitable tolling was
appropriate where a mother was unable to locate her sons after their father abducted them from
Mexico to Louisiana).
12. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006).
13. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 372 (2d Cir. 2013).

1052

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1049

A. International Treaties as Domestic Law
Any treaty to which the United States is a party is equal to federal statutes as
a source of domestic law under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.14
U.S. courts “have final authority to interpret an international agreement for
purposes of applying it as law in the United States, but will give great weight
to an interpretation made by the Executive Branch.”15 However, most treaties
are not self-executing and only apply domestically through implementing
legislation.16
B. Implementing The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction in the United States Through the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act
The Convention was opened for signature in 1980 with the intent of
“protect[ing] children internationally from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and [] establish[ing] procedures to ensure their
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as [] secur[ing]
protection for rights of access.”17 The Convention entered into force in the

14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
Once a representative of the United States has signed a treaty on its behalf, the treaty
becomes law when the President ratifies it with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. U.S.
CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (giving the President the “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”). See also
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that treaties are like
contracts “insofar as they create legal obligations” that are “legally binding only on States that
become parties to them by consenting to be bound” and that, “[u]nder general principles of treaty
law, a State’s signing of a treaty serves only to ‘authenticat[e]’ its text; it ‘does not establish [the
signatory’s] consent to be bound.’ A State only becomes bound by—that is, becomes a party
to—a treaty when it ratifies the treaty” (alteration in the original) (citation omitted) (quoting IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 610–11 (5th ed. 1998))).
For a detailed explanation of how a treaty becomes legally binding on the international
level, see ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94–115 (2d ed. 2007).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 326(2) (1987).
16. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (holding that, without implementing
legislation, an international treaty cannot bind domestic law and, therefore, does not set federal
precedent); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that, in domestic courts,
a treaty is “equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision,” except “when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court”).
17. Hague Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. For an overview of the application of the
Convention in U.S. custody practice, see 1 JEFF ATKINSON & RICHARD NEELY, MODERN CHILD
CUSTODY PRACTICE § 3A-1 (2d ed. 2010).
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United States in 1988,18 and Congress enacted ICARA to implement the treaty
in the same year.19
To effectively implement the Convention, Congress recognized “the need
for uniform international interpretation of the Convention.”20 ICARA gave
state courts and federal district courts “concurrent original jurisdiction of
actions arising under the Convention.”21 Therefore, a petitioner seeking a
child’s return may file an action in state or federal district court,22 which must
then determine the case according to the Convention’s provisions.23
The Convention distinguishes between rights of custody and rights of access.
According to the Convention “‘rights of custody’ [] include rights relating to
the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the
child’s place of residence” but, “‘rights of access’ [] include the right to take a
child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual
residence.”24 Elisa Perez-Vera’s report on the Conference that adopted the
Convention explains that “access rights are the natural counterpart of custody
rights . . . belonging to the parent who does not have custody of the child.”25
However, the report also states that while the Convention addresses access
rights,26 the Convention’s primary focus is to solve issues that result from a
child’s removal from his or her habitual residence.27
Under Article 8 of the Convention, “[a]ny person . . . claiming that a child
has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to
the Central Authority of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central
Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the return of

18. Status Table 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abductions, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
19. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, § 2, 102 Stat. 437
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2012)). Congress found that “[t]he Convention
provides a sound treaty framework to help resolve the problem of international abduction and
retention of children,” § 11601(a)(4), and declared that “[i]t is the purpose of this Act to establish
procedures for the implementation of the Convention in the United States,” § 11601(b)(1).
20. § 11601(b)(3)(B). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114
(1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States.”).
21. § 11603(a).
22. § 11603(a)–(b).
23. § 11603(d).
24. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
25. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 26. While custody rights may be held by legal
persons, including institutions and other bodies, access rights by their nature may only be held by
individuals, ordinarily the father or mother of the child. Id. ¶¶ 79–80.
26. Id. ¶¶ 16–19 (highlighting the main objectives of the Convention and mentioning access
rights in those provisions).
27. Id. ¶ 49. Thus, the drafters of the Convention intentionally placed greater priority on the
protection of rights of custody than on rights of access. Id. ¶ 65.
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the child.”28 The Convention then requires that the Central Authority “take or
cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary
return of the child.”29 If voluntary return is not secured, the authorities in the
Contracting States, whether judicial or administrative, must promptly initiate
and carry out proceedings to return the child.30
Similarly, in a case involving the breach of access rights, the Convention
directs that:
An application to make arrangements for organising or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access may be presented to the Central
Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an
application for the return of a child. . . . The Central Authorities shall
take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise
of such rights. The Central Authorities, either directly or through
intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of proceedings
with a view to organising or protecting these rights and securing
respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these rights may
be subject.31
ICARA expressly adopts the provisions of the Convention.32 Although the
statute does not define custody rights, it defines rights of access as “visitation
rights.”33
C. Courts Interpret the Convention and ICARA
A violation of rights of custody gives rise to a claim in U.S. state and federal
district courts under the Convention and ICARA.34 However, because courts
distinguish between rights of custody and rights of access, it is unclear whether
a violation of rights of access gives rise to a private right of action for those
28. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 8. The Central Authority for the purposes of the
Convention in the United States is the Department of State. Exec. Order No. 12,648, 53 Fed.
Reg. 30,637 (Aug. 11, 1988).
29. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 10.
30. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 11. Under the Convention, authorities in an
abducted-to state have the power to order the return of the child to the child’s state of habitual
residence, but do not have the power to determine the merits of any underlying custody claims.
Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 19; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2012) (“The
Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under
the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”).
31. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 21.
32. § 11601(b)(2) (“The provisions of this chapter are in addition to and not in lieu of the
provisions of the Convention.”).
33. § 11602(7) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
removal or retention of a child must be in breach of a petitioner’s custody rights to give rise to a
claim and listing the elements of such a claim: “(1) the child was habitually resident in a given
state at the time of the removal or retention; (2) the removal or retention was in breach of
petitioner’s custody rights under the laws of that state; and (3) petitioner was exercising those
rights at the time of removal or retention”).
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whose rights have been violated. In 2000, the Second Circuit held in Croll v.
Croll that rights of access, even when combined with ne exeat rights, do not
amount to custody rights as defined by the Hague Convention and ICARA.35
The court held that, because custody rights were not involved, it had no
jurisdiction to hear the claim of the non-custodial father of a child who had
been removed from Hong Kong to the United States by the child’s custodial
mother.36 However, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that ne exeat rights constitute a right of custody and confer
jurisdiction on federal courts to hear a claim under the Convention and
ICARA.37 Thus, jurisdiction over claims involving such rights would exist
under this precedent because the non-custodial parent would have a right of
custody and, therefore, a private right of action.38 However, these two circuit
court decisions did not determine whether something less than a right of
custody would be sufficient to grant federal jurisdiction over a non-custodial
parent’s claim.
Ten years after Croll, the Supreme Court partially abrogated the Second
Circuit’s holding.39 In Abbott v. Abbott, the Court held that (1) ne exeat rights
constitute a custody right under Article 5(a) of the Hague Convention, (2) U.S.
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such claims, and (3) the remedy for
violating the right of custody is one of return to the child’s habitual place of
residence.40 However, although the Abbott Court noted that there is no return
remedy provided for violations of access rights,41 the Court did not determine
if access rights alone constituted a right cognizable under the Convention in
U.S. federal courts.
Courts are divided on the question of whether federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims based on access rights, as opposed to claims based

35. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2000). Ne exeat rights are the rights of
the non-custodial parent to grant or deny consent before the custodial parent can remove the child
from the country. Id. at 139–40.
36. Id. at 135.
37. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 714 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that, under Norwegian
family law, the non-custodial parent’s ne exeat right constituted a right of custody under the
Convention when the mother had removed her child from Norway to United States); Fawcett v.
McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 499 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the right to determine residence
would ordinarily be a right of custody, but, in this case, the non-custodial parent had no such right
because the Scottish court had modified her rights and given the father the exclusive right to
determine the child’s legal residence).
38. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 714; Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 499.
39. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (2010) (abrogating the holding in Croll).
40. Id. at 8–11. The Court’s holding in Abbott was presaged by then-Judge Sotomayor’s
dissent in Croll. See Croll, 229 F.3d at 150 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mother’s
removal was wrongful under the Convention because a ne exeat right is a right of custody and,
thus, the father and the Hong Kong court jointly held a right of custody).
41. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 13 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 21).
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on custody rights.42 In Cantor, the Fourth Circuit held that rights of access
afforded by the Convention could only be vindicated in the United States
through the State Department, because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
claims regarding access rights under ICARA.43 Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen
lived in Israel when they were married in 1990.44 They had four children
before getting divorced in 1998 in an Israeli Rabbinical Court.45 After the
divorce decree was issued, Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen made several
modifications to their custody arrangements.46 Mr. Cohen moved to Germany
and retained custody of the couple’s two boys, while Ms. Cantor retained
custody of the couple’s two girls in Israel.47 However, the girls eventually
went to live with their father, who subsequently moved to the United States
with all four children.48 Ms. Cantor brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland seeking the return of, and access to, her children.49
The district court “found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Ms. Cantor’s access
claims and dismissed the complaint insofar as it request[ed] access to” the
children, who were in Mr. Cantor’s custody.50 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s decision.51
The Second Circuit, in direct (and acknowledged) disagreement with the
holding in Cantor, held in 2013 that ICARA “unambiguously creates a federal
right of action to secure the effective exercise of rights of access protected
under the Hague Convention.”52 In Ozaltin, both parents and their two
children were dual citizens of Turkey and the United States and all parties
primarily lived in Turkey.53 Following an argument, the mother took the

42. State and federal courts both clearly have authority to hear claims arising from alleged
breaches of custody rights. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2012); Hague Convention, supra note 4, art.
12. The return remedy for a breach of custody rights is not available for a breach of access rights.
See id. art. 12. However, claims for access are likely to arise on facts similar to those in Ozaltin,
where a parent asserts both custody and access claims. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
43. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006). The State Department is the
designated Central Authority for the United States. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
44. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 197.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 197–98.
47. Id. One daughter was staying in Germany with her father on an “extended visit.”
according to one of the divorce decrees. Id. The decree did not give Mr. Cohen custody of this
daughter; however, neither did it give a date for the child to return to Israel. Id.
48. Id. at 198. This change was apparently with Ms. Cantor’s consent. Id. The couple later
agreed that their other daughter would move to Germany to live with Mr. Cohen and her siblings.
Id.
49. Id. Ms. Cantor sought a return remedy to exercise her rights of access with the children.
Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 197.
52. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 372 (2d Cir. 2013).
53. Id. at 360.
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children to New York City to stay with her family.54 The mother alleged that
she talked to the father over the phone while she was in Europe on a layover,
and that he angrily told her to remain in the United States with the children.55
About two weeks after the mother and children arrived in New York City, the
father sought the return of the children to Turkey by submitting an application
under the Hague Convention to the Turkish Ministry of Justice.56 At
approximately the same time, a Turkish court issued a “protective order
barring the [f]ather from threatening or disturbing [the mother] and the
children.”57 The mother subsequently filed for divorce in Turkish court.58
The Turkish court rejected the father’s request for provisionary custody but
granted him visitation for two weekends per month, if he traveled to the United
States, as well as for two weeks during the summer of 2011, when he would be
allowed to take the children outside of the United States.59 However, the father
kept the children in Turkey beyond the court-ordered deadline to return the
children to their mother.60 He ultimately returned physical custody of the
children to their mother seventeen days later in Turkey, but refused to return
the children’s passports.61 The mother subsequently returned to the United
States with the children and demanded that the father comply with visitation
conditions that had not been imposed by the Turkish court.62 The father then
filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York requesting: “(1) an order enforcing his visitation rights, pursuant to
Article 21 of the Hague Convention; [and] (2) an order requiring the [m]other
to return the children to Turkey, pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague
Convention.”63
The district court granted interim relief requiring the mother to adhere to the
Turkish court’s original visitation order for the father, barring the removal of
the children from New York for the duration of the proceedings, and requiring
that the children’s U.S. passports be given to the court.64 The district court’s
final order required “the [m]other to (1) comply with the Turkish court’s
visitation order, [and] (2) return the children to Turkey” to allow the Turkish

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 360–61.
58. Id. at 361.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Mother had to travel to Turkey to secure their return. Id. She eventually
obtained new passports for the children. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin (In re S.E.O. & Y.O.), 837 F. Supp.
2d 536, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
62. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 362.
63. Id. (footnote omitted). The father also sought monetary restitution provided for by
Article 26. Id.
64. Id. at 363.
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court to determine the issue of custody.65 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court by holding that the court had jurisdiction over the
father’s access claim when it enforced the Turkish court’s visitation order.66
D. Other Issues in Interpreting and Applying the Convention
Several policy considerations add to the complexity of interpreting and
applying the Convention. One such consideration is the increasing blurriness
of the line between rights of access and rights of custody67 and the concomitant
difficulty courts face in interpreting these interrelated rights.68 Furthermore, as
65. Id. at 364. The court also ordered that the mother reimburse the father for court fees and
other necessary expenses related to his case. Id.
66. Id. at 369–72. The court vacated the district court’s costs award on the basis of “the
[m]other’s reasonable basis for thinking that she could remove the children,” id. at 376, and
remanded to determine a more appropriate amount. Id. at 378.
Note that the Convention and ICARA are not intended to address the underlying merits
of disputes, but merely to provide a deterrent to and remedy for their breach. See supra note 30.
Thus, in Ozaltin, the court was exercising jurisdiction over the father’s access claim but not
addressing the merits of the underlying dispute when it ordered the mother to abide by the
Turkish court’s visitation order. See Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 369–70 (declining to comment on the
substance of the parent’s custody battle).
67. See, e.g., Marilyn Freeman, Rights of Custody and Access Under the Hague Child
Abduction Convention—“A Questionable Result?”, 31 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 39, 46 (2000) (arguing
that the line between custody and access has blurred in the absence of concrete provisions to
protect and enforce access rights); Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention and
Children’s Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 409–11 (2002) (noting that
courts often interpret “custody” broadly to protect rights of access because the “Convention
appears to do little to facilitate enforcement of access” and arguing that access should be treated
as a right of the child as well as of the parent); Priscilla Steward, Note, Access Rights: A
Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 308, 312 (1997) (arguing that the
Convention’s relaxed treatment of access rights requires courts to resolve cases involving such
issues through provisions relating to custody rights, thereby confusing the two, in order to
preserve the purpose of the Convention, and that the Convention should be amended so that
courts must adhere to access orders dictated by a child’s legal resident state); Marguerite C.
Walter, Note, Toward the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Transnational
Parent-Child Contact, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2382 (2004) (arguing that “the Convention’s goal
of preventing and redressing abduction will not be fully realized until there is a means of
enforcing transnational parent-child contact” and suggesting a protocol to protect rights of
contact, including rights of access and visitation).
68. See e.g., Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that access rights,
coupled with ne exeat rights, do not constitute a right of custody under the Convention); see supra
notes 35–37 and accompanying text. Many legal scholars were concerned at the result. See also
Deborah M. Huynh, Note, Croll v. Croll: Can Rights of Access Ever Merit a Remedy of Return
Under the Hague Abduction Convention?, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 529, 531 (2001)
(arguing that “the Second Circuit’s decision [in Croll] is inconsistent with the object and purpose
of the Hague Convention as well as the relevant U.S. and foreign case law”); Christopher B.
Whitman, Croll v. Croll: The Second Circuit Limits ‘Custody Rights’ Under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
605, 623 (2001)) (arguing that the court’s holding in Croll was “inconsistent with both U.S. case
law and decisions by courts of other signatory nations of the Hague Convention” (footnote
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in Ozaltin, these cases are often rapidly evolving, with proceedings in United
States and foreign courts simultaneously.69
Jurisdiction to hear access claims can be a critical factor in granting or
denying a parent relief for the alleged violation of those rights, as evidenced in
Cantor.70 This relief or denial can in turn impact the ability of the nonremoving parent to have a meaningful relationship with their child.71
III. COURTS’ ANALYSES OF THE CONVENTION LEAD TO A CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. An Overview of the Courts’ Analyses of the Convention
The Cantor court began its analysis with the plain language of the
Convention because ICARA “states that: [t]he Convention and this chapter
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the
Convention.”72 The court focused its analysis on Article 21 of the Convention,
which addresses rights of access: “Article 21 states that an application may be
presented to the Central Authorities for securing the effective exercise of
access rights. . . . Notably, Article 21 of the Convention does not provide for
presentation to a judicial authority.”73 The court stated that this language ran
counter to Article 12, which addresses actions concerning return or wrongful
removal and directly discusses the ways to bring such claims in a judicial
proceeding.74 Because the Convention did not confer upon Ms. Cantor the
“right to initiate judicial proceedings for access claims,” the court held that

omitted) (citing Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); David S. v.
Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991)).
The Supreme Court later abrogated the holding in Croll in its decision in Abbott, finding
that ne exeat rights confer a right of custody on the holder, based on the non-custodial parent’s
ability to have a say in the child’s legal residence. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2010).
Scholars have noted the controversial nature of this holding as well. See, e.g., Martha
Winterbottom, The Nightmare of International Child Abduction: Facing the Legal Labyrinth, 5
DETROIT C. L. AT MICH. ST. U. J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 495, 512 (1996) (noting that “[t]he laws that
have been enacted to protect parents [whose children have been internationally abducted] often
leave the childless parent with little recourse”); Danielle L. Brewer, The Last Rights:
Controversial Ne Exeat Clause Grants Custodial Power under Abbott v. Abbott, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 663 (2010) (discussing the holdings in Croll and Abbott, including then-Judge Sotomayor’s
dissent in Croll).
69. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 361.
70. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006).
71. See Schuz, supra note 67, at 409 (arguing that rights of access belong to both the child
and the parent but that the Convention leaves unmarried fathers, in some countries, where a father
does not have custody or access rights, without a way to prevent the mother from leaving the
country).
72. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 199–200 (4th Cir. 2006) (alteration in the original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 200.
74. Id.
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“the federal courts are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction over [her] access
claims” under ICARA or the Convention.75
Other federal courts have also held that they did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over claims alleging a breach of access rights.76 The Cantor court
cited several district court cases to support its holding that federal courts have
no jurisdiction to resolve access claims.77 The Cantor court also cited the State
Department’s Legal Analysis of the Convention (State Department’s
Analysis),78 which states that access rights are “protected by the Convention,
but to a lesser extent than custody rights” and that “the remedies for breach of
access rights are those enumerated in Article 21.”79 Finally, the Cantor court
looked to the Senate debate immediately preceding passage of ICARA and
noted that the legislative history does not mention any rights other than those
specifically listed in the Convention.80 Because there are no such separate
rights, the court reasoned that the language of Article 21 of the Convention
must govern, and, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction over Ms.
Cantor’s access claim.81
In his dissent in Cantor, Judge Traxler argued that the court should have
started its analysis with ICARA, the plain language of which “affords
aggrieved parents a judicial forum for resolving claims that involve either

75. Id.
76. Adams ex. rel. Naik v. Naik, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that
because Article 12 does not explicitly give courts the power to grant rights of access, the court
had no jurisdiction to grant access to a child where petitioner had not been granted such rights
before); Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (holding that although
federal courts have jurisdiction over wrongful removal cases under ICARA and the Convention,
jurisdiction over access rights and breaches of those rights was limited to state courts); Teijeiro
Fernandez v. Yeager, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that because there
was no specific remedy for access claims, access issues should be left to state courts); Bromley v.
Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860–61 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that “the plain language of the
Convention does not provide federal courts with jurisdiction over access rights”).
77. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 201 (citing Adams ex. rel. Naik v. Naik, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 1030;
Wiggill, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 689; Yi Ly v. Heu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1011 (D. Minn. 2003);
Teijeiro Fernandez, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1125; Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 860).
78. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,494, 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986). The State Department’s Legal Analysis is intended to help
parents, judges, and lawyers—as well as local, state, and federal authorities—understand, use,
and implement the Convention. Id.
79. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 201–02 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention;
Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,513).
80. Id. at 202–04 (citing 134 CONG. REC. 6482–84 (1988) (statements of Sen. Dixon, Sen.
Hatch, and Sen. Simon)).
81. Id. at 204–05. The court noted that both ICARA and the Convention lack affirmative
defenses to access claims, but provide several defenses for custody claims. Id. From this
absence, the court reasoned that federal courts were not intended to have jurisdiction over access
rights violations. Id.
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custody rights or access rights.”82 Traxler noted that the Convention is not
self-executing, and thus is only given effect in U.S. courts by the implementing
legislation.83 Because of this, he wrote, “the primary focus for purposes of
jurisdiction [must] be on the statutory language” of ICARA, through which
“Congress gave the Convention domestic legal effect,” rather than on the
language of the Convention itself.84 Traxler found further support for his
position in ICARA’s “creation of separate proof requirements for custody
rights and access rights ‘in an action brought under subsection (b) of [the
Judicial remedies] section.’”85
In Ozaltin, the mother’s argument was similar to the court’s holding and
rationale in Cantor.86 She argued that the federal court did not have
jurisdiction over the father’s access claims and that rights of access may only
be enforced in state court or through the State Department as the designated
Central Authority.87 The court, however, held that “[t]he statutory basis for a
federal right of action to enforce access rights under the Hague Convention
could hardly be clearer.”88 Specifically, the court stated that ICARA
82. Id. at 208 (Traxler, J., dissenting). Judge Traxler argued that ICARA’s judicial
remedies provision gives federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over claims regarding rights under
the Convention, which includes both custody and access rights. Id. (Traxler, J., dissenting)
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(b)(4) (West 2005)). Additionally, Judge Traxler wrote: “even
assuming for analytical purposes that the Hague Convention itself does not afford the noncustodial parent a judicial forum to enforce his rights to access, Congress nevertheless has done
so.” Id. at 210 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
Judge Traxler also noted that ICARA does not distinguish between state and federal
courts with respect to the appropriate “judicial forum to ensure the exercise of access rights.” Id.
at 211–12. Noting that the inquiry is a limited one, he argues that jurisdiction over such claims
“does not require federal courts to plumb the depths of family law” and serves the Convention’s
purpose of rapidly restoring the status quo. Id. at 212–13. See also supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing issues of state and federal jurisdiction under the Convention and
ICARA).
83. Id. at 210 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (quoting Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
84. Id. (Traxler, J., dissenting) (quoting Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir.
1980)).
85. Id. at 211 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. §
11603(e)(1)). In response to Cohen’s argument that the purpose of ICARA, as described in its
preamble, limits courts to the remedies set forth in the Convention, Judge Traxler argued that
“[t]he language in ICARA’s Judicial remedies section is unambiguous and cannot be altered by
the general policy pronouncements in the preamble. Furthermore, the language of the preamble
in any case does not preclude a judicial remedy.” Id. at 211. This refusal to limit the remedies is
in keeping with the object and purpose of the treaty, which provides considerable flexibility to
each Contracting State for compliance. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 88 (“It is for each
Central Authority to choose one or the other options [to discharge its obligations under the
Convention], while working within the context of its own internal law and within the spirit of the
general duty of co-operation imposed upon it.”); see also id. ¶¶ 101, 104, 134, 138.
86. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 371 (2d Cir. 2013).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 372.

1062

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1049

“straightforwardly establish[es] that a petitioner may ‘initiate judicial
proceedings under the Convention . . . for organizing or securing the effective
exercise of rights of access to a child,’ and that ‘United States district courts
shall have concurrent original jurisdiction’ over such actions.”89 Moreover, the
court pointed out, ICARA also establishes the burden of proof in access cases,
from which it follows that an action to exercise access rights falls under the
Convention’s purview.90
The Ozaltin court also attacked the rationale of the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in Cantor, arguing that the Cantor court was incorrect when it “interpreted
Article 21 as stating that access rights can only be vindicated by applying to
the State Department.”91 According to the Ozaltin court, Article 21 should be
interpreted as allowing access rights to be secured by application to the State
Department, but the court emphasized that the State Department was not the
only way to secure access rights.92 Moreover, Article 29 of the Convention
allows a person claiming breach of a custody or access right to seek a remedy
directly from the judicial authorities of a Contracting State to vindicate those
rights.93 The court also found support for this interpretation in the State
Department’s Analysis, which states that petitioning the Central Authority “is a
nonexclusive remedy.”94
Although the courts in Ozaltin and Cantor reach nearly opposite
conclusions, the opinions have much in common. Both follow the State
Department’s guidance and agree that custody and access rights are to be
treated differently.95 However, this difference is somewhat elided in Ozaltin
because the court found that it had jurisdiction over the father’s access claim
within the greater context of his custody claim.96
The district court’s decision in Ozaltin, notably, hinged in part on the
father’s simultaneous allegation that his rights of custody had been breached
and his pursuit of return remedy under Article 12:
In neither case [cited by the mother to show lack of jurisdiction to
enforce the father’s access rights], however, was the petitioning
89. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(a)–(b) (2012)).
90. Id. (citing § 11603(e)(1)(B)).
91. Id. at 373.
92. Id. (“Article 21, however, provides that efforts to secure rights of access ‘may’ be
initiated through an application to a country’s Central Authority, not that they ‘may only’ be
pursued in this way.” (emphasis in original)).
93. Id. (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29).
94. Id. (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2006); Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 360, 372–73
(detailing the different remedies for each right according to the Convention).
96. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 363, 370, 371 n.24 (quoting Ozaltin v. Ozaltin (In re S.E.O. &
Y.O.), 837 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (noting that the district court had ordered that
the mother allow the father visitation, as granted by the Turkish court, during the pendency of the
action).
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parent alleging wrongful removal of a child under Article 12 and
seeking, as ancillary relief, rights of access as ordered by a court in
the country of habitual residence. . . . [T]his [c]ourt finds that it has
jurisdiction to enforce Petitioner’s rights of access to the Children,
and orders Respondent to comply with the visitation rights set forth
by the Turkish Court’s May 13, 2011, Order, so long as the Children
remain in the United States.97
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit painted with a much broader brush,
holding that ICARA provided a statutory basis for a petitioner to use judicial
proceedings, under the Convention, to seek an order establishing or enforcing
access rights and, moreover, that concurrent jurisdiction exists for such action
in the U.S. district courts.98
The elision of the differences between custody and access rights in a case
like Ozaltin, where the petitioner asserts both, further muddies the waters on
the issue of whether or not rights of access give rise to a private right of action
in U.S. courts.99 The Ozaltin court held that it had jurisdiction over the father’s
custody claim because he had rights of custody under the Convention.100
Further, the district court suggested that it only had jurisdiction to hear the
father’s access claim because the court had jurisdiction over his claim that his
rights of custody had been breached.101 On these facts, the Second Circuit
arguably overstepped its bounds when it held that a parent has a right of action
in federal court for breach of rights of access.102
Significantly, the courts in both cases used very similar analytical processes,
focusing on the language of the Convention and ICARA—though to varying
degrees—as well as the State Department’s Analysis and other courts’
treatment of the issue.103 Highlighting that ICARA specifically (and only)
empowers courts to hear cases arising out of rights granted by the Convention,
the court in Cantor focused its analysis on a narrow reading of Article 21 of
the Convention.104 Working from the same sources, the Ozaltin court gave
more weight to ICARA and read the Convention broadly, applying both

97. Ozaltin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 545–46 (emphasis added).
98. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(a)–(b) (2012)).
99. Id. at 363 (quoting Ozaltin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 540) (discussing the district court’s order
that the mother comply with the visitation ordered by the Turkish court during pendency of the
action over both access and custody claims). Note that, unlike in Cantor, there was an allegation
of wrongful removal or retention, which triggered Article 12. Hague Convention, supra note 4,
art. 12.
100. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 364, 371 n.24, 371–72.
101. Ozaltin, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 545.
102. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
103. See id. at 371–73; see also Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199–204 (4th Cir. 2006).
104. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 199–201, 206. Although the primary basis of the Court’s holding
was Article 21, it also found support for its holding in other sources. See supra notes 76–81 and
accompanying text.
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Article 29 and Article 21, and construing the latter Article more broadly than
the Fourth Circuit.105
While both courts turned to the State Department’s Analysis, they relied on
different sections to support their positions.106 The court in Cantor primarily
relied on the State Department’s Analysis to bolster its reliance on Article
21.107 However, the language that the Cantor court focused on refers only to
the remedy for breach of access rights, and not to the determination of whether
or not a court has original jurisdiction to hear a claim for breach of access
rights.108 The court in Ozaltin, on the other hand, cited to the State
Department’s finding that petition to the Central Authority was not the only
remedy for breach of rights under Articles 18, 29, and 34 of the Convention.109
Moreover, Article 29 allows the petitioner to use any judicial or
administrative means to return the child or enforce custody or access rights,
even if doing so bypasses the Convention entirely.110 Finally, Article 34
allows for the application of any domestic law that would allow the parent to
obtain the child’s return or to exercise his or her access rights.111
These provisions allow an aggrieved party to have recourse to any relief or
remedy available under the internal law of the State where the child is located,
in addition to having recourse under the Convention. Indeed, the State
Department’s Analysis posits:
In at least one case it is foreseeable that a parent abroad will opt in
favor of local U.S. law instead of the Convention. A noncustodial
parent abroad whose visitation rights are being thwarted by the
custodial parent resident in the United States could invoke the [The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)] to seek
enforcement of an existing foreign court order conferring visitation
105. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29). Article 29
provides that aggrieved parties may use means other than those established by the Convention to
seek vindication of their rights. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29.
106. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 201–02 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention;
Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,513 (Mar. 26, 1986)); Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373
(quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10,504).
107. See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 201–02 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,513).
108. Id. The court was correct to hold that there is no return remedy for the breach of access
rights. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 13 (2010) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4,
art. 21); Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 10,513.
109. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention;
Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,504).
110. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10,504. “Article 29 permits the person who claims a breach of custody or access rights . .
. to bypass the Convention completely by invoking any applicable laws or procedures to secure
the child’s return.” Id.
111. Id.
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rights. Pursuant to section 23 of the UCCJA, a state court in the
United States could order the custodial parent to comply with the
prescribed visitation.112
In this case, U.S. law affords more relief than the Convention, because the
custodial parent can be ordered to send the child to visit the parent living
outside the United States; the Convention does not include a remedy like this
for breach of access rights.113
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that, when a parent alleges
violation of access rights, federal courts do not have recourse to the return
remedy that is provided by the Convention for breaches of custody rights.114
This holding, however, concerns the remedy (of return to the child’s state of
habitual residence), rather than whether or not a parent has a right of access,
and leaves open—even implies—the possibility of federal court jurisdiction
over claims arising from alleged breaches of rights of access. The Supreme

112. Id. at 10,514. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was proposed by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968 in an attempt to
resolve disputes over child custody cases that involve international and interstate claimants with
custody decrees issued by other jurisdictions. FAMILY LAW STATUTES: SELECTED UNIFORM
LAWS, FEDERAL STATUES, STATE STATUTES, AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 67–68 (Walter
Wadlington & Raymond O’Brien eds., 4th ed. 2011). In 1997, the UCCJA was replaced by the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), which was adopted by all
of the U.S. states, as well as the District of Columbia. Id. at 68. The UCCJA and the UCCJEA
have similar provisions; the latter was an attempt “to bring the UCCJA into conformity with the
[Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act], and . . . to resolve other jurisdictional issues.” Id.
However, the remedies under the UCCJA or UCCJEA would be insufficient to protect
the rights of all parents, including the father in Ozaltin, because application of that statute requires
the existence of a valid custody decree. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT
ACT § 303, 9 U.L.A. 690. (1999). Rights under the Convention, on the other hand, do not require
a custody decree as a prerequisite for relief. See Hague International Child Abduction
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,505. See also International Child
Abduction Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law & Gov’t Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 34 (1988) (statement of
Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, Department of State)
(noting that, without the Convention, the State Department would be “very limited in what it can
do to help resolve the abduction to, or wrongful retention in, foreign countries in custody-related
disputes of children from the United States”).
113. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10,514.
114. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 13 (2010) (“The Convention provides no return remedy
when a parent removes a child in violation of a right of access but requires contracting states ‘to
promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights.’” (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art.
21)). See also Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12 (providing a return remedy for breach of
custody rights: “[w]here a child has been wrongfully removed or retained . . . the judicial or
administrative authority . . . shall order the return of the child forthwith”).
In contrast, Article 21 provides no such remedy but does provide that “[a]n application
to make arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be
presented . . . in the same way as an application for the return of the child.” Id. art. 21 (emphasis
added).
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Court has also noted that courts have used a variety of other remedies in cases
where the rights of access of a parent have been breached.115
B. The Second and Fourth Circuit Analyses of the Convention
Perhaps the most significant difference between the Second and Fourth
Circuits’ analyses is their interpretation of the Convention itself.116 The Fourth
Circuit relied almost exclusively on Article 21 of the Convention.117 On the
other hand, the Second Circuit looked at other parts of the Convention and
gave more consideration to the Convention’s objectives.118
According to its text, the Convention’s objects are: “(a) to secure the prompt
return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State;
and (b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”119
The Perez-Vera report explains that “the object of the Convention [] is to
discourage potential abductors.”120 More specifically, the Convention seeks to
ensure that the unilateral actions of one parent do not influence a future
decision about the custody of the child.121 As the State Department’s Analysis
explains, the Convention only “seeks restoration of the factual status quo ante”

115. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 13 (hypothesizing that “a court may force the custodial parent to pay
the travel costs of visitation, or make other provisions for the noncustodial parent to visit his or
her child” (citation omitted) (citing Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 249–50 (Mass. 1993)).
116. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373 (describing the ways the court’s analysis of Article 21 differs
from the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation).
117. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 199–201 (4th Cir. 2006).
118. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 373 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 29).
119. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. Similarly, the preamble to the Convention
states, in part:
The States signatory to the present Convention . . . [d]esiring to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual
residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access . . . .
Id. pmbl.
120. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 123. See also id. ¶ 16 (explaining that, because
abductors often claim that the authorities of State to which the child has been abducted have
rendered the abduction lawful, one means of deterring abduction is to ensure that the abductor’s
actions have no legal or practical consequences).
121. Id. ¶ 71. Additionally, “it can firmly be stated that the problem with which the
Convention deals . . . derives all of its legal importance from the possibility of individuals
establishing legal and jurisdictional links which are more or less artificial.” Id. ¶ 15. Arguably,
the risk of one party being able to change circumstances to his or her benefit unilaterally is
substantially lower in access cases, because the non-custodial parent is usually the one to seek
relief in a foreign court, and the custodial parent has sufficient ties to the jurisdiction, as in both
Cantor and Ozaltin. See Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 360–62 (noting that the parents and children were
all dual citizens of Turkey and the United States); Cantor, 442 F.3d at 198 (noting that the
custodial parent lived in Maryland and the non-custodial parent lived in Israel).
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and does not require a pre-existing custody decree.122 Once the child is
promptly returned to his or her habitual residence, as required by the
Convention, the courts of the Contracting State can adjudicate the custody
dispute to award custody based on the child’s best interests.123
Although focused on the interest of the child, the Convention does not allow
courts or other authorities to make a determination of the child’s best interests;
this determination is left to the authorities in the child’s State of habitual
residence.124
C. U.S. Courts Analyze the Object and Purpose of the Convention
Scholars have noted the importance of interpreting the Convention
uniformly and in accord with the Convention’s object and purpose.125 Both the
Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit considered the object and purpose of the
Convention in interpreting it, but the Second Circuit did so far more
extensively.126
Although the Convention’s rule on rights of access is
incomplete, it demonstrates that maintenance of regular interaction between
the parents and the children remains a priority of the Contracting States, “even
when custody has been entrusted to one of the parents or to a third party.”127
The Second Circuit’s holding is therefore in keeping with the Convention’s
object “to ensure that rights . . . of access under the law of one Contracting
State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”128
However, in some ways the provisions regarding access rights are meant
primarily to support the Convention’s underlying purpose of protecting

122. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986).
123. Id. at 10,505.
124. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶¶ 19, 23. Notably, the Convention does not leave
the responsibility of determining the best interests of a particular child in a particular case to any
jurisdiction, because doing so “involves the risk of their expressing particular cultural, social etc.
attitudes which themselves derive from a given national community and thus basically imposing
their own subjective value judgments upon the national community from which the child has
recently been snatched.” Id. ¶ 22.
125. Weiner, supra note 3, at 293–96 (discussing how the United States and other signatories
have interpreted the Hague Convention and arguing for a purposive analysis of the Hague
Convention).
126. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 367, 376 (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1)
(emphasizing that one of the key purposes of the Convention is to ensure that rights of custody
and access granted by one Contracting State are respected by all Contracting States); Cantor, 442
F.3d at 199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2012)).
127. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 17.
128. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. See also Weiner, supra note 3, at 293–96
(discussing how the United States and other signatories have interpreted the Convention and
arguing for a purposive analysis of the Convention).
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custody rights.129 Article 21 is designed as much to ease the fears of custodial
parents in allowing their children visitation with the non-custodial parent as it
is concerned with the exercise of visitation rights by non-custodial parents.130
Specifically, according to the State Department’s Analysis: “The Convention is
supportive of the exercise of visitation rights, i.e., visits of children with noncustodial parents, by providing for the prompt return of children if the noncustodial parent should seek to retain them beyond the end of the visitation
period.”131 By providing this return remedy, the Convention attempts to
alleviate a custodial parent’s concerns about allowing a child to travel abroad
“to visit the non-custodial parent.”132
Thus, the Convention supports access rights in part by providing a remedy
against those who abuse these rights. The Convention’s provisions are
designed to protect both rights of custody and of access, but such protection is
necessarily interrelated.133
Although Article 21 does not explicitly refer to “the judicial or
administrative authority”134 to which Article 12 refers, it is reasonable, in light
of the treaty’s object and purpose, to conclude that Article 21 is not meant to
proscribe the authority of judicial authorities to enforce rights of access.135
Moreover, Article 21 states that the Central Authorities are bound to “promote
the peaceful enjoyment of access rights” and to “take steps to remove, as far as
possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such [access] rights.”136
This Article also confers upon the Central Authorities the duty to conduct
“proceedings which prove to be necessary for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access.”137 The Convention envisions this duty
to “secur[e] . . . access rights as an essential function of the Central
Authorities.”138 As throughout the rest of the Convention, however, Article 21
129. See Letter of Submittal from George P. Shultz to Ronald Reagan 3, 4–5 (Oct. 4, 1985),
reprinted in Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,494, 10,496–97 (Mar. 26, 1986).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10,497.
133. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
134. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 12. Article 21 states that “[a]n application to make
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be
presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application
for the return of a child.” Id. art. 21 (emphasis added).
135. This is even more the case where the Central Authority has declared that petitioning to it
is a nonexclusive remedy. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986).
136. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 21.
137. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 95. Individuals are free to apply to the Central
Authorities to establish access rights or to enforce access rights already existing. Id. ¶ 126.
138. Id. Notably, however, “the Convention does not seek to regulate access rights in an
exhaustive manner; this would undoubtedly go beyond the scope of the Convention’s objectives.”
Id. ¶ 125. In keeping with the Convention’s overall flexibility, the text “gives no examples of
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“envisages the possibility of Central Authorities initiating or assisting in such
proceedings [for access rights], either directly, or through intermediaries,” such
as courts.139 In this context, the Convention’s drafters foresaw frequent use of
judicial proceedings.140
D. Court Analysis of ICARA
In addition to analysis of the Convention, both the Second and Fourth
Circuits relied on the legislative intent of ICARA.141 In the statute, Congress
established its intentions in the declarations:
(1) It is the purpose of this chapter to establish procedures for the
implementation of the Convention in the United States.
(2) The provisions of this chapter are in addition to and not in lieu of
the provisions of the Convention.
(3) In enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes—(A) the
international character of the Convention; and (B) the need for
uniform international interpretation of the Convention.
(4) The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United
States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the
merits of any underlying child custody claims.142
ICARA’s main purpose is to implement the Convention; the statute thus
necessarily relies on the Convention and circumscribes the authority of courts
in the United States, limiting their authority to determining rights under the
Convention.143
Notably, the Convention—and, thus, ICARA—includes
provisions for the protection of rights of access, thereby giving courts in the
United States the authority to hear claims relating to rights of access under the
Convention.144
ICARA also explicitly states that its provisions “are in addition to and not in
lieu of the provisions of the Convention,” leaving open the possibility for a
broader reading of the court’s authority under ICARA and the Convention.145
Particularly in conjunction with the provisions for the protection of rights of
access, the text of ICARA supports federal jurisdiction over access claims.

how Central Authorities are to organize this co-operation so as to secure the ‘innocent’ exercise
of access rights, since such examples could have been interpreted restrictively.” Id. ¶ 128.
139. Id. ¶ 126.
140. Id. (describing the need for cooperation between Central Authorities, as well as the
latitude such entities need to secure a non-custodial parent’s access rights).
141. See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 372 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the stated purpose
of ICARA); Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202–04 (4th Cir. 2006).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b) (2012).
143. Id.
144. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 21.
145. § 11601(b)(2).
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E. Other Policy Considerations in Applying the Convention
Several scholars have noted that the Convention and ICARA do not
adequately protect the access rights of parents and that, consequently, the line
between rights of access and rights of custody is increasingly blurred.146
Courts have had difficulty in parsing this line.147 Furthermore, protection of
these rights is interrelated,148 and the breach of both access and custody rights
often arise in the same case.149
These blurred lines and the evolving nature of many of these cases (with
cases often pending in U.S. and foreign courts simultaneously, as in Ozaltin)150
may also make it difficult to determine at the outset if the parent bringing a
claim has a right of access, a right of custody, or both. Under the Second
Circuit’s holding in Ozaltin, where the court found it had jurisdiction over
access claims, the courts need not concern itself with the distinction between
rights of access and rights of custody at the initial stages of litigation when
determining jurisdiction. Conversely, under the holding in Cantor, a federal
court would be required to make this determination at the outset.
A final policy consideration for courts faced with this issue is protection of
the access rights of the non-custodial parent.151 Because jurisdiction allows a
court to hear a potential claim, a determination of jurisdiction can be
dispositive for a parent trying to enforce access rights, as it was in Cantor.152
V. THE INTENT OF THE CONVENTION AND ICARA REQUIRE ACCESS TO U.S.
FEDERAL COURTS FOR CLAIMS OF BREACHES OF ACCESS RIGHTS
Courts in the United States must interpret the Convention in conjunction
with ICARA, which affords parents a private right of action if international
child abduction has infringed upon their rights of access. The Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation neither followed the object and purpose of the Convention, nor
adhered to the legislative intent behind ICARA.153 While the Second Circuit’s
holding in Ozaltin is more in line with the object and purpose of the
Convention and the implementing legislation, it is still troubling insofar as the
father clearly had taken advantage of forum shopping, which the Convention

146. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
147. Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 2013). See also supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
148. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 362–64. See also supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 361.
150. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 361.
151. See supra note 71.
152. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006). See also supra notes 70–71 and
accompanying text.
153. Cantor, 442 F.3d at 204 (finding the courts did not have jurisdiction for separate rights
of access under ICARA).
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expressly seeks to prevent.154 Moreover, had the Ozaltin court ordered a return
of the children to secure the Father’s rights of access alone, the remedy would
have gone too far.155 Indeed, to make such a ruling based solely on the rights
of access would breach the other parent’s custody rights.
However, courts should have jurisdiction over a parent’s cause of action to
enforce rights of access even in the absence of an allegation of wrongful
removal or retention, especially in cases where (as in Ozaltin) the access
claims are brought in conjunction with the custody claims. Refusing to enforce
visitation orders of foreign courts—or even access rights during pendency—is
not in keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention.156 Moreover,
the Convention expressly requires expeditious procedures to remedy any
breach of the rights afforded by the Convention.157 Barring access to courts
and providing a remedy only through petition to the State Department would
not serve this goal.
In light of this emphasis on expeditious procedures, the Convention’s object
and purpose require broad access to remedies for the parents of abducted
children, including access to courts in cases where access rights have been
violated. Because ICARA provides for concurrent jurisdiction in cases
brought under the Convention, federal courts must necessarily have
jurisdiction over access claims under the Convention. Particularly in cases like
Ozaltin where access claims are brought in conjunction with custody claims, it
would be a non sequitur for courts to have jurisdiction and the ability to
provide a remedy for custody claims, where the remedy is to return the child
back to the State of habitual residence, but not for access claims, enforcement
of which is significantly less draconian than the return remedy.
154. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 376 (noting the court’s “concern that certain actions of the [f]ather
may reveal forum-shopping efforts that run contrary to the purpose of the Hague Convention, thus
possibly increasing the difficulty and cost of resolving this dispute”). Such forum shopping is
particularly troubling in light of the desire of the Convention’s drafting Conference “to prevent a
later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through
unilateral action by one of the parties.” PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 71.
155. PEREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 3, ¶ 71 (detailing that the Convention’s purpose is not
to give Central Authorities the power to alter the arrangements of a previous custody
determination).
156. See supra notes 136–39 and accompanying text (explaining the duties of Central
Authorities to maintain access rights, including seeking enforcement from the courts).
157. Hague Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 (“Contracting States shall take all appropriate
measures to secure within their territories the implementation of the objects of the Convention.
For this purpose they shall use the most expeditious procedures available.” (emphasis added)).
This provision suggests a certain amount of flexibility for each Contracting State to implement
the treaty within its own territory, so long as that implementation is in keeping with the
Convention’s object and purpose. See id. Rather than focusing on particular methods for
enforcing the rights protected by the treaty, the drafters attempted to ensure that any breach of
those rights is immediately remedied, leaving to each Contracting State the method of
implementation. See supra note 85 (discussing flexibility afforded by the Convention for each
Contracting State to discharge its obligations).
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Moreover, because the line between rights of access and rights of custody is
increasingly blurred,158 it is difficult to endorse the court’s overly technical
reasoning in Cantor, much less reconcile it with the Convention’s object and
purpose. To require courts to parse the distinctions between rights of access
and rights of custody in the earliest phase of litigation would almost certainly
lead to confusion and inefficiency in what is already a difficult system to
navigate.159 Furthermore, because these rights are interrelated160 and both
rights are often breached in the same case,161 it would be difficult to justify
excluding claims arising from alleged breaches of rights of access from the
jurisdiction of federal courts. The refusal to hear access claims (and thus to
allow the parent to visit their child), while a court will hear a custody claim
(which can result in the return of the child to another State), is incongruous,
especially when the access claim is brought in conjunction with a custody
claim. Consequently, it would be difficult to justify the refusal to grant such
comparatively minor relief as access rights, while granting a return remedy.
There are many other policy considerations in favor of allowing parents to
vindicate rights of custody by private right of action in U.S. courts. Chief
among these reasons is the very real potential that a parent and child may be
denied the opportunity to have a meaningful relationship when the noncustodial parent cannot enforce their access rights in federal court; indeed, this
was the result in Cantor.162 Finally, Supreme Court jurisprudence in related
cases interpreting the Convention has not foreclosed the possibility of federal
jurisdiction over access claims.163 Accordingly, federal courts should exert
jurisdiction over claims for breach of rights of access.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts must proceed carefully in cases where one parent alleges that the
other parent has violated his or her right of access in contravention of the
Hague Convention, given how much is at stake. Holding that the only remedy
in such cases is to petition the State Department, as the Fourth Circuit did,
affords no meaningful relief to parents who have lost access to their children.
Because of the nature of these cases, access to U.S. courts is often required for
non-custodial parents to exercise their access rights. In performing the critical
role of interpreting treaties and their implementing legislation, it is important
for federal courts in the United States to abide by the object and purpose of
each treaty the courts are called upon to interpret. Denying jurisdiction over
158. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Lowe & Stephens, supra note 1, at 70–71 (noting that, in 2008, the United
States took an average of 207 days to dispose of seventy-three court claims under the
Convention); Winterbottom, supra note 68, at 511.
160. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 2013).
162. Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006).
163. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2010).
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access claims brought under the Convention fails to do so. Because ICARA
gives concurrent jurisdiction over issues arising under the Convention, federal
courts should exercise jurisdiction over rights of action for access claims.
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